To date, the only account of the 'zone of peace' among states in the core of the international system is that found in the democratic peace debates. We rework the conceptual parameters through which the object of analysis -the zone of peace -is defined in the democratic peace debates. Specifically, we historicize the concepts -'democracy' and 'war' -that enable the identification of zones of peace and war, and contextualize those histories in processes of globalization. This enables us to offer an alternative account of the emergence of zones of peace and war in the international system and of the central unit of analysis in the democratic peace debates, the sovereign and territorial liberal democratic state. This account conceives of the international system as a whole and recognizes the mutually constitutive character of relations between the zones. It opens up a research agenda focused not on why democratic states do not war with one another but on the international relations of democracy and war.
relations with each other.
2 In this article, as a first step towards an alternative account of the decline in the use of force among core states and, more generally, the emergence of so-called 'zones' of peace and war in the international system, we rethink the object of analysis in the democratic peace debates by reworking some of the conceptual parameters through which it is defined (Purvis and Hunt, 1993: 474) . We do so by locating democracy and war in relation to historical processes of global social change or globalization (Held et al., 1999; Scholte, 1996) . This enables us to rethink the context of the democratic peace and also the central unit of analysis in these debates, the sovereign and territorial liberal democratic state.
The commitment to the sovereign state structures analysis of the democratic peace in fundamental ways. Variation in the frequency and spatial distribution of war between states is attributed to the democratic character of a state's internal politics, and to the norms that emerge to govern relations between democratic states in an anarchic interstate system (e.g. Risse-Kappen, 1995a; Russett et al., 1993; Weart, 1998) . 3 Where the internal politics of states are not democratic or in relations between democratic and non-democratic states, it is assumed that interstate relations continue to be governed by realpolitik and hence the likelihood that states will go to war is not reduced (Goldgeier and McFaul, 1992 ; but see Kacowicz, 1998) . This emphasis on the state in explanations of the zone of peace 'reflects the influence realism held in the discipline at large' during the period in the 1980s when claims about the democratic peace resurfaced in North America (MacMillan, 1996: 294-5) and signals a commitment to embedded statism in the democratic peace debates. 4 A focus on the state as the basic unit of analysis has led to 'the development of the exaggerated ontological claim regarding the liberal "pacific union" and the drawing of a rigid boundary between the pacific nature of inter-liberal state relations and the warlike nature of liberal-non-liberal state relations' (MacMillan, 1996: 293) . 5 In contrast, beginning with historical processes of global social change leads to a different research agenda. Locating democracy and war in processes of globalization puts those concepts in motion and draws attention to the dynamic nature of the relations between them. These dynamics are obscured by assumptions of embedded statism. An emphasis on globalization prompts analysis of the international system as a whole and compels recognition of the mutually constitutive relations between so-called zones of war and peace -the division of the international system into discrete zones characterized by different logics of interstate relations is internal to processes of global social change. The role of force in globalization prompts a rethinking of the basic unit of analysis in these debates -the state as a juridically defined, territorially bounded, and nationally constituted entityby drawing attention to the international nature of military and police power in empires and imperial states. This de-nationalizes and de-territorializes the relation between the state and its coercive powers, transforming our understanding of the relations between democracy and force. Reworking the conceptual parameters of the democratic peace debates thus leads to a research agenda focused not on the question of why democratic states do not war with one another but on the international relations of democracy and war (Barkawi and Laffey, 1999) .
To begin, we historicize the 'democratic peace' by tracing the changing meanings of 'democracy' and 'war' and then we contextualize these conceptual histories within processes of global social change. Second, we illustrate the consequences of embedded statism for the analysis of the international relations of democracy and war by examining the role of force in globalization. Third, we bring these arguments together in a discussion of the relationship between democracy and force in post-World War II US grand strategy and the Western state project of 'making liberal spaces'. Finally, we sketch the broader implications of our argument.
The Democratic Peace in Historical Context
Our focus on historical processes of global social change grows directly out of and responds to defining characteristics of the democratic peace debates. The democratic peace hypothesis is explicitly transhistorical in nature, purporting to apply at least to the period since 1815 and, on some views, extending back to ancient Greece (e.g. Weart, 1998: Ch. 2) . This transhistorical phenomenon is identified by giving fixed meanings to 'democracy' and 'war'. In this literature, 'democracy' is defined in procedural terms and equated with the selection of a state's political leadership through contested elections with an historically variable and often an expanding franchise in a population enjoying a bundle of liberal political and civil rights. 'Democracy' is thus equated, more or less self-consciously, with liberal democracy or polyarchy (Dahl, 1961; cf. 1985) , and often in a recognizably North American form (e.g. Owen, 1996; cf. Oren, 1996) . 'War' is defined as violent interstate conflict involving at least 1000 military deaths, although there is room for variation in these criteria in order that 'obvious' examples of 'war' that do not meet the 1000 military deaths threshold (e.g. the Falklands War) can be included in the data.
6 Statistical tests generally confirm that either no or few 'democracies' have waged 'war' on one another since at least 1815 (Hagan, 1994: 185; cf. Oren and Hays, 1997) .
The claim that the democratic peace is a transhistorical phenomenon implies that the meanings of 'democracy' and 'war' can be fixed. If the terms enabling this claim are unstable, the notion that across time 'democratic' states do not 'war' with one another is undermined, as what such states are and the forms of violent conflict they engage in change.
7 This is no quibble about the meaning of words -as Macpherson noted, 'people's beliefs about a political system are not something outside it, they are part of it ' (1977: 6; cf. Rummel, 1997: 12, on 'x-ocracy') . What a political system is depends in part on people's beliefs about it. As those beliefs and the discourses that make them possible change, the political systems they are part of change too. Shifts in discourse -in the meaning of 'democracy' and 'war' -both express and participate in shifts in social relations and practices (Laffey and Weldes, 1997) .
Democracy and war are not the same thing in all times and places, nor do they have fixed relations to other social institutions and processes. Democracy is a contested concept -adopting a fixed, procedural definition renders analysis insensitive to the ways in which democracy is shaped by processes of social and political change (Held, 1987; Zolo, 1992) . War too has changed over time -adopting a fixed, quantitative definition of war means that analysis is insensitive to transformations in the nature and meaning of war, or to historically evolving forms of militarism and their impact on democracy (Shaw, 1988 (Shaw, , 1991 van Creveld, 1991) . Analysis of relations between democracy and war necessitates attention to their historical location and to their embeddedness in particular social contexts.
The mutual embeddedness of social and conceptual change raises the question of the appropriate social context for analysis of the international relations of democracy and war. For the democratic peace debates, the relevant context is relations among sovereign territorial states in an anarchic international system (e.g. Doyle, 1996) . The basic unit of analysis is the territorial and sovereign state. There is little or no attention to globalization, either as the relevant context for the phenomenon under investigation or as the source of potential explanations of it (but see Huntington, 1991) . Ahistorical and state-centric definitions of democracy and war reinforce this blindness to processes of global social change. This is a significant oversight. The processes of social change responsible for and bound up with the changing nature of democracy and war are not internal to nation-statesthey are global processes that transform both the nature of the units in the international system and the relations between them (e.g. Ruggie, 1993; cf. Panitch, 1996) . Indeed, the very notion of a democratic peace depends on the prior extension of democratic practices across sovereign spaces. We therefore locate the social context of the 'zone of peace' in the core in processes of globalization.
In this article, we use 'globalization' and 'global social change' interchangeably and focus initially on those forms of global social change associated with the extension of European forms and institutions -cultural, political, economic and social -to a progressively greater part of the earth's surface. Much recent discussion of 'globalization' emphasizes the myriad ways in which 'the world is becoming one place' and typically constructs it as a post-World War II phenomenon (e.g. Giddens, 1990; Robertson, 1992) . The presentist bias evident in this work overlooks the different forms taken by global social change over time, obscuring the ways in which 'globalization' emerges out of earlier forms of global social change associated with Western imperialism and the internationalization of capital (Douglas, 1996; Held et al., 1999; Kofman and Youngs, 1996; McMichael, 1997) . The context of the democratic peace, then, includes not only the advent of a zone of peace among core states but also international relations of domination and subordination in the periphery and the resulting practices of accommodation and resistance. 8 Another significant difference between our approach and most recent discussions of globalization concerns the state. Globalization is often defined in opposition to the state -globalization is about the state's loss of control over processes of modernization and subject formation, capital flows and the like (e.g. Appadurai, 1996; Ohmae, 1990 ). This view is mistaken. Globalization, and Western imperialism and the internationalization of capital in particular, depends on state power -it is not about the eclipse but rather the transformation of the state (e.g. . Scholars who have analysed the role of the state in globalization focus on its economic powers (e.g. Picciotto, 1991) . We extend these arguments to the ways in which the coercive powers of the state are 'internationalized', as in the transnational constitution of force in empires and imperial states. But we begin with the historicity of democracy and war, and show how this draws attention to processes of global social change.
Defining Democracy
In its classical sense of 'direct rule by the people', democracy has often been reviled by governing elites, who saw it as a source of sedition and instability (e.g. Hanson, 1989: 68; Madison, 1988 Madison, [1787 : 46). 9 Democracy implied levelling and the redistribution of wealth. Fear of class rule -of the rich by the poor, who far outnumbered them -fuelled this view of democracy as dangerous (see Latham, 1997: 27) . The rearticulation of democracy as liberal democracy reflects both historically shifting balances of class power and changing inter-class alliances. The growth of an urban working class as a result of spreading industrial capitalism, coupled with the consequences of conscription for mass citizen armies, led to calls for expansion of the franchise. The pace and extent of this expansion depended in large measure on the willingness of the middle classes to ally with the working class against traditional aristocratic elites. As a result, the middle classes exercised an effective veto on the meaning of democracy (Rueschmeyer et al., 1992) . The triumph of liberal democracy over other potential articulations of 'rule by the people' derives from efforts -ideological, coercive and institutionalon the part of ruling and emergent classes to defang the perceived dangers of expanded notions of democracy and enlarged franchises (Therborn, 1977) . These efforts were contested, often through attempts to radicalize the language of liberal democracy by exploiting the tensions between 'democracy' -rule by the people -and 'liberalism' -the rights of the individual and of private property (Bowles and Gintis, 1987; Held, 1995) . A progressive shift in favour of the rights of property over the rule of the people signals the triumph of a liberal conception of democracy.
The nature of liberal democracy has been shaped also by the rise of mass societies and the bureaucratization of politics. Prompted in part by the introduction of large-scale industrial processes that required concentration of populations in urban locations, mass societies developed alongside the global spread of industrial forms of production (e.g. Barraclough, 1967; Giddens, 1985) . In the context of vast, impersonal and ideologically malleable urban masses, both democratic and non-democratic political systems became dominated by party machines articulated with the highly developed systems of administration and enforcement characteristic of the modern state (e.g. Lindbloom, 1977; Zolo, 1992) . These developments contribute to the centrality of ideology and nationalism in 20th-century politics and shape the ability of states to use force and the forms of warfare in which they engage (Mann, 1996) .
Liberal democratic institutions enable the expression -mediated through bureaucratic party structures -of popular interests. In this sense, liberal democracy does make a difference. But liberal conceptions of democracy also have a class content (see Jessop, 1978) . This is overlooked in the democratic peace debates, which take for granted that liberal democracies are 'market democracies' and that liberal political institutions are embedded in, and reflect, capitalist social relations. Dahl and many others argue that a capitalist socio-economic order limits the democratic potential of liberal democracy and constrains the prospects for development beyond polyarchy (1998: 178-9) . Liberal democracy contributes directly to the maintenance of a capitalist socio-economic order -it is 'equilibrium democracy' (Macpherson, 1977: Ch. 4) . One consequence of an increasingly narrow and settled conception of democracy is that it serves to stigmatize alternative expressions of democratically grounded claims. A hegemonic liberalism 'defines out' other historically valid democratic claims and may licence violence against them. 10 These contested histories are the appropriate starting point for thinking about what liberal democracy is and what it does. Pointing to its malleable nature, Dryzek suggests that democracy be understood not in procedural terms but as a project, as the product of political struggle over the degree to which the public can participate in ordering the conditions of their lives.
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Different forms of democracy are linked to the particular social contexts out of which they emerge and reflect the relations of power found there, of capital and labour, for example, or core and periphery. Democratic projects are shaped by local and international relations of power. This is obscured by a stipulated procedural definition, and so is invisible in the democratic peace debates.
Defining War
The meaning and nature of war too has changed over time. Wars occur in definite historical contexts which shape their conduct and consequences for other social relations and processes. In Clauswitz's famous definition, war is the continuation of politics with the admixture of other means, namely force. A Clauswitzian approach to analysis places war in historical context. It is sensitive to the particular social and strategic terrain upon which political authorities and their military forces operate. By contrast, Correlates of War (CoW) structures definitions of war in terms of sovereign borders, which creates its core distinction between intra-and interstate wars. The category of interstate war assumes an historical context of 'trinitarian war ' (van Creveld, 1991) . The political entities that wage it are made up of a government, a people and a military which exist behind sovereign borders as recognized in international law. These assumptions entail the embedded statism characteristic of the democratic peace debates and enable the claim that democratic states do not wage war on one another. However, they obscure historical shifts in the nature and conduct of war, and the significance of these shifts for the development of Western democracy.
Beginning in the middle of the 19th century, war was progressively industrialized and totalized. During the World Wars of the first half of the 20th century in particular, the bureaucratization and industrialization of warfare along with the advent of mass society produced a new form of 'total' war and arguably transformed the Western state into a 'single national firm for waging war' (McNeill, 1982: 317) . Conceptions of the nation were harnessed directly to total war through the mass conscription of male citizen armies (e.g. Hobsbawm, 1990; Mann, 1988: Ch. 6 ). Historically static definitions of war render the totalization of modern conventional warfare marginal to analysis, despite its significance for the kinds of political, social and economic institutions that characterize contemporary Western liberal democracies (e.g. Giddens, 1985; Sparrow, 1996; Tilly, 1992) . The merging of industry, technology and bureaucracy into a machinery for waging war contributed directly to the militarization of society (Gillis, 1989; Shaw, 1991) and the consolidation of authority within the executive of 'actually existing democracies' (Fraser, 1992) . Additionally, large-scale modern conventional warfare in the core is of necessity alliance warfare, and entails a meshing of the military and industrial complexes of allies. Alliance cooperation in World War II laid the groundwork for the integration of Western militaries that was a feature of both the Cold War and the post-Cold War eras. In these and other ways, the totalization of war has broad implications, not only for what war is and how it is conducted but also for the social institutions and practices of democracy.
The advent of nuclear weaponry changed fundamentally the context and manner of strategic competition between core states. While the CoW data reflect the decline in the instance of interstate war after 1945, they can shed no light on the nature of the changes in the strategic context that confronted policy-makers. As many commentators on the Cold War noted, wherever the superpowers confronted each other directly, as they did in Europe, there was 'no alternative to peace' due to the threat of nuclear suicide (Eisenhower, quoted in Aron, 1968: 2) . Superpower forces neutralized each other by their mutual presence. The enforced nuclear peace meant that the local forces of clients and proxies became more important instruments for conducting superpower competition. The periphery took on central importance as the site of armed conflict. The nature of war changed -policy-makers found other ways to use force as an instrument of policy. Even in the periphery, the forces of only one superpower could become engaged in any particular locality and both sides resorted to various forms of raising troops from foreign, client populations. Since they did so in the context of the formal, sovereign independence of Third World states, these armies appear in the CoW data as 'belonging' to states other than the superpowers, which supplied, trained, advised and often directed them in battle. The assumptions of trinitarian war embodied in CoW's typologies obscure these shifts in the way force is used as an instrument of policy. 12 Hence these typologies are not appropriate for analysis of warfare across historical, social and strategic contexts.
Democracy and War in Global Social Context
The historical evolution of democracy and war is not restricted to individual states; it is part of broader patterns of global social change. By adopting fixed definitions meant to apply across historical periods and spaces, the democratic peace literature cannot attend to the implications of such change for the meaning of democracy and war and for the historically and spatially evolving relations between them. Patterns of global social change impact directly on the nature and meaning of democracy and war and on the conditions under which states can and do use force.
For example, democracy became one of the major organizing principles of core states during the creation of a global system of empires, forged and maintained by colonial wars. Global processes of colonization and decolonization had a direct impact on the development of democracy as a form of social and political organization, both in former colonial territories and in metropolitan states. Imperial power was pitted against local communities and peoples defending or seeking forms of rule often more democratic than those imposed on them. The emergence in former colonies of modern forms of political and social organization such as the territorial state, capitalist or command economies, and democratic or bureaucratic-authoritarian politics is unintelligible apart from the experience of colonization and decolonization. 13 Mass parties in one-party systems and authoritarian forms of state, for instance, were often the side-effects of organizational imperatives stemming from the prosecution of anti-colonial war (e.g. Fidel Castro's Cuba; Ho Chi Minh's Vietnam). In this and other ways, forms of organization adopted in the context of struggle structure postcolonial political forms in profound ways (Ahmad, 1995) . Significantly, one-party systems were often articulated as 'democratic'. If democracy is about rule by the people, there is nothing inherently undemocratic in rule being carried out by a single party. What is important, at least rhetorically, is the relationship between 'the people' and the party as a vehicle through which 'the people', viewed as a collective subject rather than an aggregation of rights-bearing individuals, struggle and exercise rule (Mann, 1999) . States and peoples fashion democratic claims and institutions according to their histories and position within a changing international system.
Wars of decolonization shaped the colonizers too, contributing to social and political upheaval in the US and Britain, and to political transformation in France and Portugal. Resistance to imperialism in the periphery led to transformation in the core. The US experience in Indochina had direct consequences for the practice and meaning of US democracy and its relation to war. New forms of military manipulation of the media, for example, were developed in the wake of the Vietnam War, forms designed to limit the kind of criticism that plagued the US military in Vietnam and to build 'support for the troops' in future conflicts (Klare, 1991 (Klare, , 1995 . The conflict in Vietnam had consequences also for the US way of waging war. US efforts to militarize Third World states were stepped up, as specified in the Nixon Doctrine, in order to shift further the burdens of containment strategy on to client armies. Moreover, the employment of US forces themselves was rethought, for example in the Weinburger Doctrine, which sought to use them only in situations of overwhelming superiority and with adequate public support. To maintain this support, considerable effort was put into minimizing US casualties, as evidenced by the preference for air power in post-Cold War conflicts. As a result, the nature of war changed, both for the US public and for the objects of US military action. For the vast majority of the US civilian population war took on the character of a 'spectator sport' (Mann, 1988: 183 ff.) in which nationalist and militarist sentiments could be safely expressed. Meanwhile, the Iraqi and Serb populations were subjected to prolonged aerial bombardment designed to minimize Western military casualties. The dynamics of these relations are global; they cannot be reduced to 'internal' and 'external' spheres nor can causation be located exclusively in one or the other. Analysing the relationship between democracy and war thus requires explicit attention to processes of global social change.
Locating the context of democracy and war in globalization reveals how misleading is analysis that takes the categories that enable the democratic peace hypothesis as fixed. It leads to recognition of the integral relations between developments in the (liberal democratic) core and elsewhere and so prompts analysis of the international system not as divided into zones of peace and war but as a structured whole (Held and McGrew, 1998: 222-4) . It also forces us to rethink the centrality of the sovereign territorial state in analysis of the international relations of democracy and war.
The Democratic Peace in the Territorial Trap
The conceptions of democracy and war that inform the democratic peace hypothesis presuppose the territorial state -'democracy' refers to a particular set of electoral institutions and political and civil rights within the boundaries of a sovereign state and 'war' refers to interstate relations. Taken together, this means that at the core of the democratic peace debates sits a particular entity -the (liberal democratic) sovereign territorial state. Beginning with the sovereign territorial state helps motivate a focus on interstate dyads and means that explanation can move in only one of two directions -either inwards to domestic society (e.g. or outwards to the international system, conceived as the space in which states interact (e.g. Risse-Kappen, 1995a) . Assumptions of the state as a sovereign entity and the location of state-society relations within a territorially defined totality reinforce the presumption of anarchy in interstate relations (Alker, 1996: Ch. 11 ) and the turn to classical realist models of geopolitical relations. The democratic peace debates are caught in the 'territorial trap' (Agnew and Corbridge, 1995: Ch. 4) .
Such a commitment is problematic in analyses of the relationship between democracy and the use of force in the context of ongoing processes of global social change. These assumptions produce a blindness to global social relations and their role in reshaping both the state and the international organization of force. As Agnew and Corbridge argue, 'The territorial state has been "prior" to and a "container" of society only under specific conditions ' (1995: 94) . 14 In statistical investigations which assume that states are essentially the same since 1815, historical processes of social structuration constitutive of diverse spatial patterns of rule, state forms and uses of force are obscured (Shaw, 1999) . Similarly, variation in the relations between state, society and territory is also obscured by assuming those relations to be fixed. By fixing the essential territorial character of the liberal democratic state, the history of social and political relations, of those relations constitutive of states and the international system they are embedded within, is 'stripped of explanatory force' (Maclean, 1984: 137; Rosenberg, 1994) . We are then literally unable to conceive of explanation in anything other than state-centric terms. Partly in response to the consequences of embedded statism for the democratic peace research agenda, MacMillan (1996) calls for more analysis of actually existing democracy, both domestically and within the international system, and of the use of force by liberal democrats (e.g. Wolfe, 1973) and by liberal democratic states (e.g. Blum, 1995) . Attention to these issues illustrates the consequences of embedded statism for analysis of the international relations of democracy and war and offers one way out of the territorial trap.
Owing to the widespread tendency to assume that states and globalization stand in opposition to each other, or to locate global social change only in the latter part of the 20th century, the role of force and in particular of state power in globalization is often obscured. Yet, it is difficult to understand the extension of European institutions and social forms to the rest of the world without reference to powers of coercion. Examining the role of force in globalization enables a critique of the view of the state as a sovereign territorial entity or 'bordered power container' (Giddens, 1985) that informs the democratic peace debates. This critique proceeds along the core dimension of state power -force -and draws attention to the fact that coercive power is not only 'projected' out of a national, sovereign territory but is also constituted transnationally (Barkawi, 1999) . This is clear if we examine the constitution of force within empires, for 250 of the past 300 years the dominant form of polity in the international system (Doyle, 1986; Petras and Morley, 1981; Shaw, 1997: 499) .
Empires and imperial states in the core of the international system have repeatedly deployed force against states and populations in the periphery in the service of the imperial project of extending European rule and social institutions to the rest of the world. 15 For states that are or have been both imperial and liberal democratic, such as Belgium, Britain, France, Holland or the US (see Doyle, 1996: Table 1 ), analysis of the relations between democracy and war must attend not only to the significance of ideational factors and domestic politics for interstate relations, as in the democratic peace debate, but also to the transnational constitution and international organization of force and the ordering of internally differentiated and territorially dispersed populations. Even at their height, empires typically do not display the centralization of authority that is taken for granted in discussion of the sovereign state (Robinson, 1972) . The relationships between the formal apparatus of the 'home' state within an empire (e.g. Britain) and the populations, both at home (e.g. in Wales, Scotland, Ireland and England) and abroad (e.g. in Australia, Egypt, India and Kenya), over whom rule was exercised were multiple and diverse (Buzan and Little, 1996: 414 ff.; Wendt and Friedheim, 1995) . They included both direct and indirect rule, through clients and private companies, for example, not dissimilar from the role of superpower clients and MNCs in the Third World or arguably the more recent role of multinational peace keeping and police forces (e.g. Coughlin, 1999) .
What is at stake here is not merely the deployment of force but more fundamentally the constitution of it -imperial states and empires typically constitute significant coercive power from colonized and client populations and that force is integral to processes of globalization. Colonial and client armies and police forces were a central component of the forces available to imperial states, both for purposes of security and expansion in the nonEuropean world as well as for interstate competition and total war in Europe (e.g. Echenberg, 1991; Offer, 1989) . For example, with few significant exceptions, the US largely prosecuted the Cold War in the Third World through a variety of client forces, supported and sometimes installed in power with covert or overt use of US military and intelligence professionals (see Cohen, 1994 , for a realist analysis). This force was often deployed against the extension of democracy. US covert action to overthrow Third World elected governments (e.g. Allende in Chile; Arbenz in Guatemala; Ortega in Nicaragua) is not seen as invalidating the democratic peace proposition because the US did not use its national military forces openly, but relied instead on clients, mercenaries and covert operatives (Russett et al., 1993: 123; cf. McClintock, 1992) . In this way, sovereign juridical conceptions obscure the actual constitution of force, through imperial 'advice and support', and its use in projects of informal empire. This Cold War practice is but a variation on an old theme. Force is integral to globalization but assumptions of embedded statism obscure the transnational constitution of force, and in particular the role of forces raised in the periphery itself as 'agencies of the globalizing trend' (Cox, 1996: 155) .
This example reminds us also of how recent is the advent of sovereign territoriality as a universal norm and draws attention to the role of representational practices in producing and securing these hierarchical relations. During and after World War II, the US explicitly defined itself against the old European empires and new modes of organizing the nonEuropean world were developed in the wake of de-colonization. Similar in some ways to the era of informal empire which preceded the formal colonies of the latter 19th century, these new modes involved the formal independence of peripheral states which, in itself, provided such states with degrees of autonomy over certain spaces. This opposition, between (US) state and (European) empire, was inscribed in scholarship and reinforced by the development of area studies as a particular way of conceptualizing the peripheral domains, a way tied more or less directly to US state interests (Lewontin et al., 1997; Rafael, 1994) . Area studies framed the world in terms of 'a nation-specific, modernization ontology' (Cumings, 1999) . Part of the project of dismantling European empires and opening up the new states to US interests and capital was legitimated by assuming the separation of territorially defined nation-states. Peripheral states were studied as if they were territorially contained entities just like core 'nation-states', even if subject to higher degrees of intervention and at an earlier stage of 'development'.
Recalling the processes through which empires and imperial states constitute force and exercise rule highlights the consequences of embedded statism for analysis of the international relations of democracy and war. Empires and imperial states constitute force transnationally and use it to extend, defend and order spaces that have an inherently multiple and problematic relation to juridical borders. After World War II, both West Germany and Japan 'were reintegrated into the advanced industrial world as "semisovereign" powers: that is, they accepted [sic] unprecedented constitutional limits on their military capacity and independence' (Ikenberry, 1998/99: 69) . Both states were 'reconstituted' in ways that enabled the projection of US power abroad. We are not suggesting that relations between the US, Japan and West Germany were the same as those between Britain and its colonies. But the division of the world into formally sovereign and nominally independent political authorities does not preclude the production and reproduction of social relations that transcend or cut right through the sovereign boundaries that enable the democratic peace hypothesis and are taken for granted in the democratic peace debates (e.g. Jenkins, 1987) . Analysis of such relations, and of the international relations of democracy and war, is hindered by assumptions of embedded statism. We elaborate this claim below in a discussion of the role of force and democracy in the making of liberal spaces (Latham, 1997) .
Democracy and Force in the Making of Liberal Spaces
Following Dryzek (1996) , we conceive of democracy not in procedural terms but as an ongoing, historically evolving political project. That project takes diverse forms. Seeing liberal democracy in these terms directs attention to questions of purpose -whose project is this? -of means -how has this project been advanced? -and of location -where has this project been pursued? We begin, like the democratic peace debates, with the state.
Weber defined the state in terms of its distinctive means, coercive power, because such power is used by states for a variety of different ends and purposes. States use coercive as well as administrative and ideological means in the pursuit of various political projects. This raises for analysis the question of what kinds of projects states pursue in various social and historical contexts. The notion of purpose or project need not entail an overly centralized view of the ability of executive authority in sovereign territorial states to make and enforce decisions. Rather, the state should be seen as an interrelated, complex and varied structure with an identifiable directionality (Cammack, 1989; Jessop, 1990) . That directionality is shaped in diverse ways by the particular context of social relations within which the state is embedded.
For example, in its imperial heyday the British state and the economic interests closely articulated with it pursued the project of organizing peripheral economies to suit capital accumulation through a variety of loosely coordinated agencies. India was brought under British rule largely through a private corporation, the East India Company, which had its own military. In turn, the Company pursued its policies through a variety of arrangements with Indian elites and clients, which sometimes collapsed into open warfare, and through which clients retained a degree of local autonomy. There was constant struggle between London and the Company with respect to India policy and the degree of central state control over the Company, a struggle finally resolved in favour of the central state only after the mutiny of much of the Company's army in 1857. Nonetheless, the incorporation of Indian territories and populations, the reworking of local social relations, and the associated 'opening of the economy' to British interests proceeded along similar lines both before and after that date (Keay, 1994) . Through diverse actions -some directed to this end, some notcarried out by diverse agents -some states, some not -'India' became 'British'. There was a directionality to policy in the absence of close coordination and control of all 'state' agencies by a central leadership.
Answering questions about the purposes to which state power is put requires explicit attention to the social context -both geostrategic and political economic -of particular states and world orders. A comprehensive treatment of the relationship between democracy and force in the context of globalization would require attention to the legacies at home of the British, French, Dutch and other European empires, as well as analysis of the relationships of force and violence to democracy outside the Western core. For reasons of space and its relevance to the decline in the use of force in the core, in the remainder of this article we focus on the post-World War II order centred initially on the US and more recently on a Western international state. 16 (An account of relations of democracy and war in other imperial orders, such as that of Britain or France, would of course be different.) In contrast to the democratic peace debates, we place greater emphasis on the internationalization of capital. Our aim here is to construct an account of the zones of peace and war alternative to that found in the democratic peace debates. This account illustrates the kind of analysis enabled by a focus on global social change.
US Grand Strategy after World War II
Post-World War II US grand strategy consisted of two parts. First, there was the doctrine of containment. This applied to both the Soviet Union and the US's Western allies.
West Germany and Japan were shorn of their previous military and political clout during the period of American occupation, but their industrial economies were encouraged to revive, and they were posted as engines of growth in the world economy. Meanwhile, the United States kept both countries on defense dependencies and shaped the flow of essential resources to each, thus to accumulate a diffuse leverage over all of their policies and to retain an outer limit veto on their global orientation. (Cumings, 1992: 87-8) In these ways, Japan and West Germany were rendered semi-sovereign. Second, as stated in NSC 68, there was the effort 'to foster a world environment in which our free society can survive and flourish' (in Etzold and Gaddis, 1978: 402) . An important part of that effort concerned the 'modernization' and 'development' of the soon to be ex-colonial world (Escobar, 1995) . With respect to political economic relations, post-World War II US geostrategic policy expressed long-term processes of transatlantic class formation associated with the expansion and deepening of circuits of capital in the North Atlantic region (van der Pijl, 1984) as well as the Fordist compromise between capital and labor within the US (Rupert, 1995) . Both parts of this world order project -the geostrategic and the political economic -entailed the reshaping of state-society relations, in the core and in the periphery, and had direct implications for the ways in which force was constituted and deployed. In the core, the reshaping of state-society relations took the form of 'exporting' the Fordist model to Western Europe and Japan, as well as intervening directly to head off what were perceived as threats to this US model -both inside and outside the US itself -from competing political projects, associated in the US often with labour unions and their political allies, and in Western Europe with the communist resistance to fascism and Nazi occupation (Cox, 1996: 428 ff.; Davis, 1986: 186-90; Rupert, 1995: Ch. 7) . Outside the West, the production of liberal spaces typically did not entail any extension of civil and political rights but instead focused more explicitly on the preservation of 'order' through coercive means and the defence of economic rights for local and external elites (Kolko, 1988) .
Within the core, the geostrategic component of this strategy relied heavily upon the deployment of US troops. But outside it the preservation of 'order' generally took a different form. Over the course of the post-World War II period, US state managers came increasingly to see the utility of local administrative and coercive apparatuses for the preservation of 'order'. At stake was the construction of an apparatus for the transnational constitution of force that enabled the 'American system' to survive and flourish in the face of heterogeneous local challenges to it. The idea, said Eisenhower in 1957, was 'to develop within the various areas and regions of the free world forces for the maintenance of order, the safe-guarding of frontiers, and the provision of the bulk of ground capability'; the 'kernel of the whole thing' was to have indigenous forces, i.e. non-Americans, bear the brunt of any future fighting (quoted in Gaddis, 1982: 153) . The key point here is that they were fighting and dying to defend and maintain a US and, increasingly, a Western imperial order, and often not against external subversion associated with the US-Soviet conflict but against competing local -and often democratic -political projects (Kolko, 1988; McCormick, 1995) .
Although this use of force was typically justified by reference to the USSoviet struggle, as Klare (1989: 160) argues, the dominant motive often appeared to be 'a fear of indigenous revolutionary movements'. Behind or alongside the East-West conflict was a second and in some ways more persistent North-South conflict concerned not only with the defence and extension of capitalist social relations but also the protection of investments and access to resources. This second conflict was less likely to entail US troops standing guard along frontiers, as they did in South Korea or central Europe, and more likely to be conducted by indigenous forces, trained and supported by the US, as in Haiti, El Salvador, Chile under Pinochet, the Philippines, or Iran under the Shah . Both strategies are best understood as part of what Latham (1997: 65-70) problematically terms the 'external' state, i.e. the transnational apparatus through which the US constituted force. To see this apparatus as external neglects the consequences for politics, society, economy and culture inside the US (Cumings, 1999; Lewontin et al., 1997) . The apparatus through which the US constituted force was integral, not external, to the US state.
Inside and outside the core Western states, then, US post-World War II grand strategy can be understood in terms of the production of liberal spaces, that is, territories and populations administered in a variety of ways but which shared certain characteristics understood by US state managers to be consistent with US interests and with the preservation and extension of a US-centred liberal and capitalist world order. In important ways, the contemporary international system is a product of the liberal project evident in post-World War II US grand strategy.
Democracy and Force in an Imperial Order
The democratic peace debates begin by asking a realist question -why do some states not use force in their relations? They answer that democratic states use force in pursuit of their interests, except when they are confronted with other democratic states, at which point liberal logics come into play (e.g. Doyle, 1996; Risse-Kappen, 1995a; cf. Weldes, 1996) . In contrast, we begin by asking why do states and state managers use force? We argue that they do so in the service of a project of ordering through which liberal spaces are produced. We do not disagree that liberal democratic states -at least in the core and very recently -tend not to go to war with each other. However, this is not because they are inherently peaceful in their relations, or because of the nature of their domestic political systems or the spread of liberal norms. The use of force between these states is unlikely because they are embedded in geostrategic and political economic relations that buttress international state and capitalist power in hegemonic, i.e. non-violent, ways. 17 Beginning with a set of liberal democratic states rather than an emergent Western or transnational state means that the democratic peace debates remain caught in the territorial trap. They miss the significance of processes of globalization for the nature of the units in the system, the ways in which force is constituted, and the reasons why it is deployed.
In the post-World War II period, US grand strategy produced an 'interlocking structure of military alliances, aid programs and nuclear tripwires' (Davis, 1986: 183) . Nowhere was this 'interlocking structure' more developed than among the liberal democratic states at the core of the international system. Little has changed since the collapse of the Soviet Union -NATO has expanded eastwards and used force for the first time, and US security relations with Japan and other key allies have been reaffirmed. By deploying a Weberian view of the state as an autonomous centre of political-military power, Shaw argues that these processes of military integration have produced a western state -'a massive, institutionally complex and messy agglomeration of state power centred on North America, western Europe, Japan and Australasia ' (1997: 501) . But a focus on force misses the deeper processes of transformation also taking place, and hinted at in Davis's reference to 'aid programs'. This 'multi-national military integration' preceded and made possible the internationalization of capital, the interpenetration of the major capitalist economies and processes of transnational class formation. 18 Writing from a Marxist perspective, Davis (1986: 183) describes the result as an 'ultra-imperialist military economic order'. From both Weberian and Marxist perspectives, then, it is argued that sovereign territorial states in the core are being integrated into 'the state of globalization' (Shaw, 1997) . Seen in this light, it makes little sense to ask why these states do not war with one another.
Discarding the assumptions of embedded statism that underpin the democratic peace hypothesis enables us to illuminate developments obscured in extant explanations of the decline in the use of force among core states. Our argument also casts in a different light constructivist accounts of the democratic peace by refiguring the context of the cultural factors they invoke (e.g. Adler, 1997a; Risse-Kappen, 1995a ). Adler argues, for example, that 'the democratic peace is about the social construction of a transnational "civic culture" (Almond and Verba, 1963 ) that engenders mutual trust and legitimacy ' (1997b: 347; 1997a: 257-60) . The project of making liberal spaces is linked with and carries forward certain cultural elements. But they are both embedded in a set of social relations and shaped by the social forces that sustain them. The concept of a 'civic culture' grew out of Almond and Verba's participation during the 1950s and 1960s in the formation of area studies, a project marked by both the imperial interests of the US and the assumption that a capitalist and liberal West was 'the model of the modern' (Almond, 1970: 151, 10-27, 155; Cumings, 1998; Gendzier, 1998) . In attributing the democratic peace to the internationalization of a civic culture, Adler ignores this history and the role of force in it. He also misses the links between civic culture and capitalism (see Deudney and Ikenberry, 1999: 193-4) . This is the return, at the level of the interstate system, of liberal modernization theory in constructivist fancy dress.
As The Economist noted in 1995, 'the belief that democratic states do not go to war with one another has become a commonplace of western policy' (1 April: 17) . The alleged consequences for interstate relations of the extension of democratic norms and institutions to non-democratic states are used to justify efforts by already democratic states to export democracy elsewhere (e.g. Clinton, 1994: A17) . The logic of this discourse is simple and compelling -if democratic states do not go to war with one another, we ought to make more of them, and thereby produce a more peaceful world. In this respect, the discovery of an inverse relationship between 'democracy' and 'war' both appears to confirm long-held assumptions deriving from 19th-century liberal thought about the peaceful propensities of republics and reinforces long-standing rhetorical commitments of the US and other Western powers to the promotion of democracy abroad. Through the National Endowment for Democracy and other agencies, the US and other core states are currently seeking to extend polyarchy to states around the world. Rhetorical commitments to democracy are not matched by the commitment of resources, however. The major recipients of US foreign aid, for instance, have changed little despite the end of the Cold War and the turn to democracy promotion in US foreign policy and there is little correlation between progress towards 'democracy' and aid (Hook, 1998) .
Meanwhile, efforts to ensure the protection and extension of property rights and to restrict the range of legitimate action of even formally sovereign and democratic states are more vigorously pursued, with the aim of producing 'market democracies'.
19 These efforts have strong continuities with Cold War policies of modernization and development. 20 Discarding assumptions of embedded statism -without assuming that states are unimportant or have ceased to war with one another -enables us also to redescribe the ongoing liberal project unevenly manifested in policies of democratization and structural adjustment. 21 The project of liberal ordering evident in recent Western policy can be framed as the production of liberal spaces, democratic subjects and institutions to administer them. 22 In this new geostrategic and political economic context, we argue that force is used in the service of defending and expanding economic and to a lesser extent political liberalism (in the guise of democracy) beyond the liberal capitalist core.
The project of liberal ordering has ideological, institutional and coercive moments. The ideological moment involves the articulation of the meaning of democracy to the project of ordering. The aim is to produce populations who understand themselves and experience the social relations in which they are embedded as democratic. The institutions that administer these populations are also to be understood as democratic. Indeed, from this point of view, the institutions of polyarchy -elections, legislatures and liberal civil and political rights -are definitive of democracy, even as they place real limits on it. The point here is not whether or not these institutions are democratic in some objective, transhistorical sense but rather that they are represented, and come to be accepted, as such; thus, it is common sense that the United States is a democratic country (cf. Rupert, 1999) . That said, the language and institutions of democracy can be and are appropriated by challenges to the liberal order (Bowles and Gintis, 1987) . Advancing the interests of some of the population but by no means all, the project of liberal ordering may prompt overtly democratic opposition to the class relations entailed in it (Brecher and Costello, 1994) . As with the imperial liberalism pursued by the US after World War I, 'When this pattern of events [and relations] was called democracy, as it often was, the rest of the population tended to conclude that democracy was not what it wanted' (Williams, 1972: 96) . States and other actors who resist such claims are then liable to be represented as non-or anti-democratic, thus licencing violence against them (Oren, 1996) .
The coercive moment involves the use of force for purposes of extending or defending liberal spaces both at home and abroad. Force is used to draw boundaries that are not necessarily coterminous with the juridical territory of the state. Indeed, the extension of liberal spaces in the territory of other states, peripheral or otherwise, involves the use of force to draw boundaries abroad. During the Cold War, such boundaries took the form of the geopolitical division between the 'Free World' and the Communist Bloc. When this boundary ran through sovereign states, new sovereign borders were simply created, as in Korea, Vietnam and Germany. Within the Free World, force was used to discipline, or even exterminate, unruly subjects, such as trades unions, indigenous movements, communist parties or other popular challenges that were pursuing competing political projects (e.g. George, 1991; Klare and Kornbluh, 1988) .
Despite much rhetoric to the contrary, after the Cold War the centrality of sovereign borders is in certain respects being reinforced (e.g. labour migration; Drainville, 1995: 61-70) . Significantly, where force is required to put down opposition to the liberal project it is typically drawn from local populations, within formally sovereign states. Within the 'liberal heartland', force usually takes the form, literally, of 'policing'; outside that heartland, the resort to military and other forms of informal coercion is more common (but see Churchill, 1996) . For example, British Petroleum recently financed a Columbian Army brigade to guard its facilities against guerrilla attacks. The brigade also employed terror against local villagers protesting degradation of their farmland caused by BP operations (Gillard et al., 1998) . Similarly, the US administration used mercenaries and private contractors, among others, as part of a covert counterinsurgency operation in support of the Colombian security forces (Robberson, 1998) . More generally, what we see are a variety of state and non-state agencies independently deploying force in ways that contribute to the project of liberal ordering. 23 The local or non-national character of these agencies ought not to obscure the nature of the context in which such force is deployed, nor the larger project to which it contributes. Despite being separate and discreet, such actions are also integrally related insofar as they are each part of a larger effort -a strategy without a strategist 24 -to make liberal spaces. Through various means, then, there are produced systematic relations between the so-called 'zone of peace' and the 'zone of war'. Thus might we begin to rethink both the context of and the relations between democracy and force in the post-Cold War international system.
Conclusion
The democratic peace debates raise important questions about the ways in which liberalism, democracy and force contribute to the production of peaceful worlds. These questions cannot be adequately addressed within the limits of the debates as currently defined. Our discussion of the relations of democracy and war proceeds from a set of political commitments other than those of liberal scholars such as John Owen or Bruce Russett. These commitments do not make our account any less scientific; all social inquiry necessarily proceeds from an evaluative standpoint (Weber, 1949) . Much of the literature upon which our account is based, despite being directly concerned with the relations between democracy and force and of the highest scholarly quality (e.g. Kolko, 1988; , is invisible in the democratic peace debates. The spread of liberal democracy takes on a different character when read through this literature. Locating democracy and war in historical processes of global social change and throwing doubt on the embedded statism that structures these debates, we have sought to open up a research agenda centred not on the question of why democratic states do not use force in their relations one with another but instead organized around the international relations of democracy and war. That agenda must begin by critically interrogating the terms framing it. Equating Kant's republican constitutions with 'representative democracy' (Russett et al., 1998: 441) , for example, or attributing the democratic peace to the internationalization of a 'civic culture' (Adler, 1997b: 260) betrays a deeply unreflexive attitude to analysis. None of the terms that enable the democratic peace proposition can be taken for granted. Instead, analysis must put in question the primacy of sovereign boundaries and historicize rather than stipulate the meaning of war and democracy. Instead of fetishizing liberal democratic institutions and norms, it must attend to the multiple relations between liberalism and other social processes. And instead of assuming that liberalism is a force for peace, analysis must attend to the ways in which it promotes the use of force. The ultimate aim of our argument, then, is not simply to critique the democratic peace hypothesis but to draw attention away from the investigation of a single hypothesis regarding liberal democracy and war. Redirecting scholarly attention to the wider universe of relations between democracy, war and liberalism opens up new space for the investigation of their role in the making of peaceful and not-so-peaceful worlds.
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1. In these debates, 'democracy' and 'liberalism' are used more or less interchangeably. Since part of our purpose here is to highlight the ways in which 'democracy' has been defined in liberal terms, we refer to the 'democratic peace'. Cohen (1994: 214-16) argues that the democratic peace proposition holds only for the states in the North Atlantic and West European area after 1945; see also Shaw (1997) ; cf. Russett and Ray (1995) and Cohen's rejoinder (1995: 324) . Kacowicz (1998) supports Cohen's argument by demonstrating that peace has been sustained for long periods in South America and West Africa, often in the absence of democracy. 2. The literature is huge and growing. Overviews and representative examples include Adler (1997a); Brown et al. (1996); Elman (1997) ; Russett (1992, 1993) ; Weart (1998) . 3. Research linking the democratic peace to economic interdependence (Oneal and Russett, 1997; cf. Maclean, 1984) and participation in international organizations (Russett et al., 1998; cf. Cox, 1996) is also structured by assumptions of this kind. 4. On embedded statism in the social sciences and International Relations in particular, see Taylor (1996 Taylor ( : 1919 ; Agnew and Corbridge (1995: Ch. 4 ); Maclean (1981: 103) . On the dominance of realism in International Relations, see Vasquez (1983) ; Kapstein (1995) . 5. For efforts to account for the continuing propensity of democratic states to use force against non-democratic ones, see Doyle (1996: 30 ff.) ; Owen (1996: 117ff.) ; and Risse-Kappen (1995a). 6. Weart (1998: 13) uses a threshold of 200 combat deaths. Thanks to Ronald Page for discussion of the Correlates of War project's coding procedures. 7. This also undermines arguments focusing on mutual recognition between democracies as the key causal mechanism in explaining the democratic peace 19. For example, in the 'export' of Western legal systems to new jurisdictions and the structural adjustment policies of the IMF and World Bank -compare the situation in war-torn former Yugoslavia (Chossudovsky, 1996) and in Mozambique (Hall and Young, 1997: Ch. 9) . 20. An emphasis on economic relations rather than civil and political rights continues in current US policy towards China, in international agreements such as NAFTA, the GATT (e.g. Raghavan, 1990 ) and the forthcoming MAI, as well as in current Western policy towards Eastern Europe and the states of the former Soviet Union (e.g. Gowan, 1995) . This foreshadows the replication in the periphery of the historical development of democracy in the West. 21. Agnew and Corbridge (1995: 206 ) is a non-statist representation of the postCold War order. 22. Of course, states are not the only agencies that make liberal spaces. They are also produced, for example, through the often well-intentioned actions of NGOs that bring liberal conceptions of human rights to Mozambique (Hall and Young, 1997: 225) , of retired US lawyers who volunteer to teach law in Ukraine, and of 'social movements for transnational capitalism' (Sklair, 1997) . 23. Thus it is a mistake to see our argument as a form of conspiracy theory, or as implying that the actions of peripheral governments are orchestrated or directed by other, external agencies. 24. This notion derives from Foucault (1980: 94-5) ; see also Doty (1996: 105) .
